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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore’s Paradox  1
Abstract. Is self-knowledge a requirement of  rationality, like consistency, or 
means-ends coherence?  Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of  
asserting, and the alleged irrationality of  believing, Moore-paradoxical 
propositions of  the form <p, but I don’t believe that p>.  If  there were 
nothing irrational about failing to know one’s own beliefs, they claim, then 
there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or 
beliefs.  This paper considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore’s 
paradox might be marshaled to support rational requirements to know one’s 
beliefs, and finds that none succeed. 
1. Introduction 
To hear philosophers tell it, rationality requires a lot of  us.  It requires us to have 
logically consistent beliefs,  or else probabilistically coherent credences.   It requires us to 2 3
believe the obvious deductive consequences of  our existing beliefs, at least if  we entertain 
them.   It requires us to intend to do the things that we believe are necessary means for 4
achieving our ends.   It requires us not to believe things that we believe we shouldn’t 5
believe,  and not to intend things that we believe we shouldn’t do.   It requires us to have 6 7
preferences that make us representable as having a utility function, and to act in ways that 
maximize expected utility.   And so on.  Now I’m not sure myself  about everything on this 8
list, and perhaps you’re not either.  But as a first pass, it illustrates the kind of  things that 
rationality is supposed to require of  us. 
Does rationality require us to know our own minds?  Or if  not self-knowledge, does 
rationality at least require something in the ballpark, like accurate higher-order belief ?  Many 
philosophers have thought so, and have taken Moore’s paradox to support their thinking. 
This paper will oppose these common views. 
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2. Self-Knowledge Requirements 
Whether self-knowledge is rationally required is of  central importance to how we 
should understand its nature.  In particular, it would be a major strike against theories that 
make introspective self-knowledge out to be too much like ordinary perceptual knowledge, 
as Sydney Shoemaker has argued.  If  lacking self-knowledge amounts to a violation of  
rationality’s requirements, this supports Shoemaker’s famous contention that it is impossible 
to suffer from self-blindness, the condition of  lacking a capacity for introspective 
knowledge despite possessing idealized rationality, intelligence, and conceptual 
sophistication.  And if  so, this is hard to reconcile with broadly perceptual accounts of  
introspection.   An agent can be ideally rational and yet be ignorant of  various facts about 9
her surroundings, due for example to perceptual limitations like ordinary blindness.  If  that 
is impossible for one’s own beliefs, it would seem our way of  knowing them must be quite 
different from ordinary perception.  Indeed, this is a central rationale behind recent 
rationalist alternatives to the perceptual model.  10
A rational requirement for self-knowledge also would affect our understanding of  
rationality.  I discuss elsewhere the difficulty of  reconciling a self-knowledge requirement 
with evidentialism about rational inference, in contrast to reliabilism and other 
consequentialist accounts.   And others have argued that self-knowledge requirements are a 11
natural complement to conceptions of  rationality that emphasize critical reflection on one’s 
beliefs.   Still, my hope is to stay more neutral on many recent controversies about the 12
general form and normative significance of  rational requirements.   Are they wide or 13
narrow scope?  Synchronic or diachronic?  Strict or permissive?  More or less fundamental 
than claims about what reasons, or about ideally rational agents?   While these questions are 
important, my concern is the relationship between self-knowledge and rationality, not how 
rationality in general ought to be understood.  For concreteness, I will pitch things in terms 
of  synchronic wide-scope requirements, though my hope is that not much turns on this.  In 
a few places where something might, I’ll mention it. 
An immediate question about such requirements is what the scope of  the required self-
knowledge is.  Because of  its especially direct connection to Moore’s paradox, my focus here 
will be on knowledge of  one’s beliefs.  Perhaps anyone who says that rationality requires 
knowledge of  beliefs should be prepared to say that it also requires knowledge of  other 
mental states, on pain of  arbitrariness.  Extending self-knowledge requirements to other 
 Throughout, I use ‘introspection’ broadly to include any distinctive method we have for knowing our beliefs, 9
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mental states might raise additional difficulties for my opponents, but I won’t worry about 
them.  14
Limiting the scope to beliefs leaves open further questions, including whether it really 
should be knowledge that is required, as opposed to something less demanding.  But again, my 
hope is that  the details won’t matter too much.  I will argue that Moore’s paradox fails to 
motivate a wide range of  potential requirements, including for instance: 
(SELF-KNOWLEDGE)  Rationality requires that if  one believes p, then one 
knows that one believes p. 
(HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS) Rationality requires that if  one believes p, then 
one believes that one believes p. 
(NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS) Rationality requires that if  one believes p, 
then one does not believe that one does not believe p. 
I refer to these and related requirements collectively as self-knowledge requirements, 
though only SELF-KNOWLEDGE is a bona fide requirement for knowledge.   I group them 15
together because I think even the weaker requirements retain much of  the theoretical 
interest of  SELF-KNOWLEDGE.  Like it, HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS and NO HIGHER-ORDER 
ERRORS make self-knowledge and higher-order belief  out to be very different from 
knowledge and belief  about other deeply contingent matters.  Just as one can rationally fail 
to know facts about one’s surroundings due for example to ordinary blindness, one can 
rationally fail to have true beliefs about them.  According to HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS, 
things are different regarding one’s beliefs.  If  you in fact believe that it will rain, and you do 
what rationality requires, then you will have the true belief  that you believe it.  While NO 
HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS takes us a step further from requiring self-knowledge, it still 
preserves a special rational significance for higher-order beliefs.  Deceived agents like brains 
in vats plausibly can have false but rational beliefs about most any contingent matters of  
fact.  But NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS says this is impossible when it comes to your own 
beliefs. 
This last point could be denied by some objectivist epistemologists, who might accept: 
(NO ERRORS) Rationality requires that one believe that p only if  p.  16
Under NO ERRORS, brains in vats and other deceived agents hold their false beliefs 
irrationally, and so would any agent deceived about her beliefs.  But I don’t want to pick a 
fight with someone who thinks false higher-order beliefs are irrational solely because all false 
beliefs are irrational.  What I want to know is whether there is a distinctive requirement 
involving self-knowledge or higher-order belief, something that belongs in the same category 
 For difficulties, see Adler and Armour-Garb 2007.  And see Byrne 2018 for proposals that could be adapted 14
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as conventional non-truth-involving requirements like those glossed in Section 1.  Perhaps 
on some objectivist views, there is nothing positive to say about the false beliefs of  a 
deceived agent who follows these subjectivist requirements.  If  so, maybe the whole category 
of  non-truth-involving requirements needs to be tossed out, in favor of  objectivist 
requirements like NO ERRORS.  I won’t have much to say here to that view.  But a moderate 
objectivist might allow the deceived agent’s beliefs to qualify as rational (or “reasonable”) in 
some derivative sense, despite violating more fundamental objective requirements like NO 
ERRORS.   If  so, my discussion here might need to be recast, but its animating concerns 17
would not go away.  For there remains the question whether there could be an agent whose 
violations of  NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS are reasonable, in whatever sense a brain in a 
vat’s false beliefs about its environment can be reasonable. 
Part of  why I want to remain noncommittal about how to formulate self-knowledge 
requirements is to avoid the pitfall of  having my opposition turn on needlessly strong 
formulations.  I worry that some common objections to self-knowledge requirements are 
guilty of  this.  Even if  successful, it is not clear that they undermine the very idea of  a special 
requirement involving higher-order belief  or knowledge.  This can give the impression that 
even the opponents grant that rationality requires some degree of  something resembling 
self-knowledge, and that what’s debatable is merely what it is and what degree is required.  18
One such objection, raised in different contexts by Alex Byrne, Quassim Cassam, and 
others, is that a requirement like SELF-KNOWLEDGE is too demanding.   Whenever I hold a 19
belief, complying with SELF-KNOWLEDGE will mean knowing and thus holding the further 
belief  that I hold it.  But then I will be required to hold a belief  that I hold that further 
belief, and so on.  This might be claimed to be metaphysically impossible, or at least 
psychologically unrealistic. 
Retreating to HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS will not help, since it too imposes a ‘positive’ 
requirement to have the right higher-order beliefs.  But going further to NO HIGHER-
ORDER ERRORS would, since it imposes only the ‘negative’ requirement not to have the 
wrong ones.  Maybe this is a reason for retreat, or maybe not.  But in any case, the question 
whether retreat is warranted seems like a side issue.  For similar problems involving the 
application of  idealized standards to non-ideal agents arise for requirements unrelated to 
self-knowledge, such as: 
(SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE)  If  p logically entails q, then rationality requires 
that if  one believes that p, then one believes that q. 
To some of  us, SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE has the ring of  truth.   If  p entails q, then 20
the truth of  p conclusively establishes the truth of  q, making it seem incoherent to accept p 
as true but not q.  But as it stands SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE is arguably too demanding. 
Among other things, it resembles SELF-KNOWLEDGE in requiring an infinity of  beliefs. 
 Cf. Lasonen-Aarnio 2010 and Williamson 2017 and forthcoming.17
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Now one possible response is to reject SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE altogether, and deny any 
direct relationship between rationality and logic.   But to many, this seems like overkill. 21
Perhaps SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE should be somehow restricted, or replaced by 
something else connecting rationality and logic in a different way.   Or perhaps ideal 22
rationality is extremely demanding after all.   Proponents of  SELF-KNOWLEDGE must 23
choose from a similar menu of  responses, but the very idea of  a self-knowledge requirement 
doesn’t hang in the balance.  24
The same goes for opposition to SELF-KNOWLEDGE on the grounds that self-
knowledge is defeasible, as stressed for example by David Christensen and Brie Gertler.  25
Suppose I believe that my mother loves me, but there are psychologists lining up to tell me 
that I don’t really believe this.  It could be claimed that if  so, I cannot know that I hold this 
belief, arguably in contrast to SELF-KNOWLEDGE. 
It is debatable whether retreating to HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS or even NO HIGHER-
ORDER ERRORS helps with defeasibility worries.  Following Christensen, we might say I 
rationally should withhold belief  on whether I believe that my mother loves me, in contrast 
with HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS.   Perhaps I even should outright believe that I do not 26
believe my mother loves me.  If  so, then retreat to NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS might not 
go far enough.  Perhaps a further retreat is warranted, to something with a ‘no defeaters’ 
condition. 
But again, defeasibility worries are not idiosyncratic to self-knowledge requirements. 
They can be raised for many alleged requirements, including SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE.  If  
I rationally believe p, and have logicians lining up to tell me (falsely) that p doesn’t entail q, 
then intuitively I shouldn’t believe q.   Again, we might claim that SINGLE PREMISE 27
CLOSURE needs restriction to cases where one lacks defeaters.  Or claim that one can be 
faced with conflicting requirements.   Or bite the bullet, and claim that ideal rationality does 28
require believing q.   Or something else.  Again, this is a problem for rational requirements 29
in general, not a distinctive problem about self-knowledge. 
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A final objection to SELF-KNOWLEDGE adapts Williamson’s argument that no 
nontrivial conditions are luminous.  If  sound, this argument would show that one can 
believe that p without being able to know that one believes that p.   This might seem to 30
spell trouble for self-knowledge requirements.  On a controversial but plausible ought-
implies-can principle, you cannot be rationally required to know something you are unable to 
know.   So if  you cannot know you have a belief, you cannot be required to know it, 31
contradicting SELF-KNOWLEDGE. 
While I oppose self-knowledge requirements, I think their defenders have responses to 
the anti-luminosity argument that are plausible by their lights.   But we do not need to 32
rehash this debate here, or even get into the substance of  Williamson’s argument.  For even 
if  the argument gives us reason to reject SELF-KNOWLEDGE, it still leaves open the broader 
question of  special requirements involving higher-order beliefs.  For example, since you can 
believe something without knowing it, the anti-luminosity argument does not impugn 
HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS via an ought-implies-can principle. 
Perhaps HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS could be impugned in another way, for example by 
an objectivist premise that you are never required to believe what you cannot know.  But this 
premise, like NO ERRORS above, is more controversial than anything the luminosity 
argument is usually advertised as assuming.  Suppose you have strong but misleading 
evidence.  You are plausibly rationally required to believe what your evidence supports, but 
your belief  will fail to be knowledge because it is false.  And if  we think there is a reliability 
condition on knowledge, this yields other plausible cases of  requirements to believe what 
you are in no position to know.  Suppose you see a real barn while unknowingly traveling 
through fake barn county.  Given your perceptual evidence you might be rationally required 
to believe that it is a barn, but your belief  arguably is not knowledge, because of  unreliability. 
Cases of  this latter kind are especially germane to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. 
The failures of  luminosity that he alleges involve higher-order beliefs that, while true, are not 
knowledge because they violate a reliability condition.  Even if  such cases are possible, they 
need not be cases where true higher-order beliefs are not rationally required.  They might be 
counterexamples to SELF-KNOWLEDGE, but not to HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS. 
Despite my opposition to self-knowledge requirements, I doubt that these or any other 
quick and easy refutation of  them succeeds.  Any refutation will involve complicated 
engagement with very broad debates about the nature of  rationality and self-knowledge.  In 
contrast, some  supporters of  self-knowledge requirements claim a simple and decisive 
argument in their favor.  The argument is supposed to stem from Moore’s paradox. 
 Williamson 2000, Ch. 4.  See also Byrne 2019, pg. 38 and Silins 2012.30
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Moore’s paradox is often presented as a motivation for rationalism about introspection, 
in some discussions the primary motivation.   It is also a common motivation for views that 33
take critical reflection to be central to rationality.   Sometimes Moore’s paradox is cited in 34
defense of  broadly consequentialist thinking about rationality,  and a tension between 35
vaguely Moorean views and evidentialism is widely acknowledged.   It also is common in 36
advancing controversial requirements of  rationality on broadly consequentialist grounds to 
appeal to SELF-KNOWLEDGE as a largely undefended premise.  Often a passing nod to 
Moore’s paradox is included.  37
So Moore’s paradox is arguably the leading quick and easy motivation for self-
knowledge requirements if  anything is.  Even for theorists who simply find these 
requirements intuitively attractive, I wonder if  Moore’s paradox might go some way towards 
bringing their attraction into sharper focus.  It is often said that even though Moorean 
propositions are logically consistent, there is some subtler kind of  conflict present in one’s 
asserting them.  Proponents of  self-knowledge requirements might similarly think that, even 
though an agent who violates them can remain consistent in her beliefs, there is some subtler 
sense in which her doxastic states are in conflict.  So I hope that my discussion of  Moore’s 
Paradox might still somehow connect with their thinking, albeit indirectly. 
3. Moore’s Paradox 
G. E. Moore observed that it is somehow improper (or “absurd”) to assert propositions 
of  the form <p, but I don’t believe that p>.  Just what this impropriety consists in is not 
obvious.  To streamline things for my opponent, I will assume that it at least includes 
irrationality, such that: 
(NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS) Rationality requires that one not assert 
propositions of  the form <p, but I don’t believe that p>.  38
Like other requirements we have considered, NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS is defeasible. 
And perhaps unlike the others, it is not plausibly a basic requirement of  rationality.  Instead, it 
at best is a consequence of  more basic requirements.  It is also questionable as a fully general 
requirement.  One arguably can rationally assert a Moorean proposition if  ordered to at 
gunpoint, after all.  What is less open to question is that asserting a Moorean proposition is 
 See, e.g., Fernández 2005 and 2013; Moran 2001, pp. 69-77; Shoemaker 1996; Silins 2012 and 2013; Smithies 33
2012b, 2016, and 2019; and Zimmerman 2008, Sec. III.
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1995, pg. 19.
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irrational in normal circumstances, given the knowledge, beliefs, and aims held by speakers 
in such circumstances. 
Explaining NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS is not so easy as explaining why, say, it is 
irrational to assert an obvious contradiction.  As is commonly observed, Moorean 
conjunctions are logically consistent, and often true.  But despite the initial difficulty, a 
remarkably diverse range of  explanations has been proposed.  The earliest often appealed to 
communicative aims or norms distinctive of  assertion.  Paradigmatic examples include 
Moore’s own account in terms of  what assertions “imply”, Gricean accounts citing 
conversational maxims or communicative intentions associated with assertion,  and various 39
Wittgensteinian accounts that posit a distinctive use of  avowal statements like ‘I don’t believe 
that it will rain’ for expressing a first-order lack of  belief  that it will rain, perhaps in addition 
to describing one’s lack of  belief.  (These accounts are usually cast as explaining the 40
impropriety of  Moorean assertions, but they can be adapted to explain their irrationality by 
supposing that agents in normal circumstances aim to avoid impropriety and know it when 
they see it.) 
How is NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS supposed to get us to self-knowledge 
requirements?  Probably the most detailed argument, from Sydney Shoemaker, is examined 
below in Section 6.  But first, I want to consider a rough motivation that seems to me far 
more prevalent.  Instead of  proceeding directly from NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS, it appeals 
to a corresponding requirement involving belief: 
(NO MOOREAN BELIEFS) Rationality requires that one not believe 
propositions of  the form <p, but I don’t believe that p>.  41
It is widely supposed that NO MOOREAN BELIEFS gets us close to self-knowledge 
requirements, or to closely aligned rationalist theories of  introspection, which deny the 
possibility of  self-blindness.   But there is less consensus on finer-grained questions about 42
exactly which self-knowledge requirements are supported, or how. 
One natural idea, proposed for example by Jordi Fernández, is that NO MOOREAN 
BELIEFS directly supports NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS.   While we will see some wrinkles 43
in Section 4, this suggestion has obvious appeal.  In effect, NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS 
merely prohibits jointly believing the conjuncts of  a Moorean conjunction.  And jointly 
believing the conjuncts might seem obviously irrational if  believing the whole conjunction is. 
 For accounts drawing on Grice’s work in different ways, see Martinich 1980 and Shoemaker 1996, pp. 38-40 39
and 75.  As Martinich observes, Grice himself  (1989, pg. 42) rejected Martinich’s version.
 See, e.g., Bar-On 2004, Heal 1994, and Rosenthal 1995.40
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Now it might seem that this direct motivation at best supports NO HIGHER-ORDER 
ERRORS, the weakest of  the self-knowledge requirements.  In my book this alone would be 
of  interest, since I think NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS makes higher-order errors out to be 
different from errors about other matters of  fact.  But there might also be a way of  directly 
supporting the stronger requirement HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS.  Following Declan Smithies, 
we might think that if  conventional Moorean beliefs are irrational, then so are beliefs in 
conjunctions like <It will rain, but maybe I don’t believe it will rain>.   Smithies plausibly 44
takes the rationality of  believing that maybe something is the case to go with that of  lacking 
a belief  that it is not the case.  If  so, HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS also might be directly 
supported by broadly Moorean considerations. 
A different idea is that self-knowledge requirements are supported indirectly, by an 
inference to the best explanation.  This too is suggested by Fernández and Smithies, among 
others.   If  Moorean beliefs are irrational, it might be hard to explain why without invoking 45
a rationalist theory of  introspection that vindicates SELF-KNOWLEDGE.  Indeed, I think the 
inference to the best explanation is especially forceful if  we accept the above direct 
motivation for NO HIGHER-ORDER ERRORS.  If  we thought it possible for an ideally 
rational agent to lack a capacity for introspective self-knowledge, it is hard to see what could 
prevent this self-blind agent from sometimes rationally holding false higher-order beliefs, for 
example when confronted with misleading behavioral evidence about her first-order beliefs. 
In any case, we don’t need to settle on the best path from NO MOOREAN BELIEFS to 
self-knowledge requirements, because I will claim in the next two sections that NO 
MOOREAN BELIEFS itself  is unmotivated.  In Section 4, I will consider the common view 
that Moorean beliefs must be irrational because they are in some sense guaranteed to be 
false.  Then in Section 5, I will turn to the suggestion that the irrationality of  Moorean 
beliefs is what explains the irrationality of  Moorean assertions.  I think both motivations for 
NO MOOREAN BELIEFS fail, and that the former would undermine the broader case for self-
knowledge requirements even if  it worked.  After these sections opposing NO MOOREAN 
BELIEFS, I will get back to Shoemaker’s argument in Section 6. 
4. First Route to Self-Knowledge Requirements:  Banning Foreseeable Errors 
Many treat NO MOOREAN BELIEFS as an obvious datum, which should serve as a 
starting point for any plausible account of  Moore’s paradox.   I don’t buy it.  At best, what’s 46
an obvious datum is that Moorean beliefs are guaranteed to be in error, as claimed for 
example by Sydney Shoemaker, Declan Smithies, Roy Sorensen, Ralph Wedgwood, Aaron 
 Smithies 2012a.  Note Smithies’ examples are different, because his topic is knowledge of  justification rather 44
than belief.
 Fernández 2013, pp. 138-140 and Smithies 2016, pg. 408 and 2019, Ch. 4.  Though less explicit, an inference 45
to the best explanation seems present in Moran (2001, pp. 69-77), Shoemaker (1996, pg. 77), and Zimmerman 
(2008, Sec. 3).
 E.g., Chan 2010, pg. 212; de Almeida 2001, pg. 33; Fernández 2005, pg. 534 and 2013, pg. 112; Gibbons 46
2013, pg. 213; Heal 1994, pg. 6; Kriegel 2004, pg. 100; Moran 2001, pg. 70; Shoemaker 1996, pp. 75-76; 
Smithies 2016, pg. 397; Wedgwood 2017, pg. 45; Zimmerman 2008, pg. 331.
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Zimmerman, and Mitchell Green and John Williams.   The idea is that believing a 47
conjunction of  the form <p, but I don’t believe that p> suffices for believing the first 
conjunct.  And believing the first conjunct suffices for the second conjunct being false.  48
Maybe this means that Moorean beliefs are guaranteed errors.  And maybe this even counts 
as a datum.  But NO MOOREAN BELIEFS would follow only given something like: 
(NO GUARANTEED ERRORS) Rationality requires that one not believe that p 
if  it is necessary that if  one believes that p, then not-p. 
But NO GUARANTEED ERRORS has unappealing implications.  It arguably contradicts 
the common intuition that Lois Lane can rationally believe that Clark Kent is not Superman. 
And supposing a functioning cortex is necessary for having beliefs, it means a scientifically 
uninformed agent could not rationally believe a doctor’s testimony that her cortex has ceased 
functioning.  49
However, there is another way to defend NO MOOREAN BELIEFS, advanced by Declan 
Smithies, and by Mitchell Green and John Williams.   Rather than just assuming the obvious 50
datum that Moorean beliefs are guaranteed errors, it assumes that this is an obvious datum. 
If  it is obvious, then a rational agent with the relevant concepts is in a position to know it. 
So NO MOOREAN BELIEFS will follow given: 
(NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS) Rationality requires that one not believe that p 
if  one can know that if  one believes that p, then not-p. 
To many, NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS might itself  seem obvious.  For comparison, it 
presumably is normally irrational to deliberately make assertions that are foreseeably 
erroneous, at least if  one aims to speak the truth.  For example, if  I usually keep my 
meteorological opinions to myself, my evidence might support the quasi-Moorean 
conjunction <It will rain, but I will not assert that it will rain>.  But it still would be 
irrational for me to deliberately assert this, since I can know that it must be false if  I do. 
My suspicion is that something like this analogy between assertion and belief  (or 
judgment) is often behind the claim that NO MOOREAN BELIEFS is an obvious datum. 
 Shoemaker 1996, pg. 76; Smithies 2016 and 2019; Sorensen 1988, Ch. 1 and pg. 388; Wedgwood 2017; and 47
Williams 1994, pg. 165; Zimmerman 2008, pg. 329, and Green and Williams 2011, pp. 249-250.  See also Briggs 
2009, pg. 79, and see Chan 2010 for criticism.
 It is unclear beliefs in comissive conjunctions of  the form <p, but I believe that not-p> are guaranteed 48
errors.  But they plausibly are still likely errors.  This weaker claim is arguably all my opponent here needs to 
adapt her view to comissive cases, if  she accepts NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS below.
 For discussion, see Barnett MSb.  Maybe NO GUARANTEED ERRORS still could be upheld, for example by 49
objectivists who accept NO ERRORS, which forbids false beliefs of  any kind.  But as I discussed in Section 2, 
this would deflate the interest of  a weak self-knowledge requirement against higher-order errors.  I think it also 
would undermine an indirect Moorean motivation for stronger self-knowledge requirements, since NO ERRORS 
would explain the irrationality of  Moorean beliefs without them.
 Green and Williams 2011, pp. 249-250 and Smithies 2016 and 2019.50
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Shoemaker stresses such an analogy when introducing this now common claim.   And the 51
analogy makes appearances in recent discussions from Alan Hájek, Richard Moran, Antonia 
Peacocke, Nico Silins, Declan Smithies, Timothy Williamson, and Mitchell Green and John 
Williams.  52
But if  this is the rationale behind NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS, it is a problematic one. 
The problem is not with its assumption that foreseeably erroneous assertions are irrational; 
they plausibly are, as discussed in Section 5 below.  It is rather with the analogy between 
assertion and belief.  Beliefs and assertions are importantly different, and the requirements 
for one might not apply to the other.  Most obviously, beliefs, unlike assertions, are 
involuntary.  And this plausibly has normative significance.   If  beliefs were directly 53
voluntary, you might settle whether to believe a proposition p by deliberating directly about 
the question whether to believe it.  But beliefs typically are not settled this way, and perhaps 
cannot be.  Instead, in ordinary doxastic deliberation, the object of  your deliberation is the 
question whether p.  This is a different question, and it might be rational to answer it 
differently.  54
Indeed, even if  you could indirectly produce beliefs voluntarily, for example by pressing 
belief-causing buttons, the buttons it would be rational to press might not always match the 
beliefs it is rational to hold.  It is a familiar point that it can be rational to cause yourself  to 
be irrational.   This goes for beliefs, too.  Suppose you are offered a cash prize for believing 55
some tree in the park has exactly 224,618 leaves.  It plausibly would be irrational to believe 
this, but it surely is rational to press a button that will cause you to believe it.   The potential 56
for mismatch between what it is rational to believe and what it is rational to cause yourself  to 
believe is most obvious in cases like this, where your causing the belief  is motivated by 
monetary aims, rather than purely truth-directed ones.  But potential mismatch is not limited 
to these cases.  Even if  your aims are truth-directed, there can be mismatch in familiar cases 
of  epistemic tradeoffs.   If  I promise to tutor you in algebra if  you believe I’m the coolest 57
kid in school, that will not make it rational to believe I’m the coolest.  But it might make it 
rational to cause yourself  to believe it, if  one measly false belief  about me is outweighed by 
all the true beliefs you would get about algebra. 
I raise all this because I think Moorean beliefs and some others under the purview of  
NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS are further cases of  mismatch.   Now I don’t mean the great 58
many beliefs that are foreseeably erroneous just because one knows the relevant proposition 
 1996, pp. 78-79.51
 Hájek 2007, pg. 219; Moran 2001, pg. 70; Peacocke 2017; Shoemaker 1996, pg. 78-79; Silins 2012; Smithies 52
2016 and 2019; Williamson 2000, pp. 255-256; and Green and Williams 2007, pg. 3.
 See, e.g., Hieronymi 2009.53
 Cf. Hieronymi 2005 and Shah and Velleman 2005.  Note that related points plausibly hold for other attitudes.54
 E.g., Parfit 1986, pp. 12-13.55
 Cf. Kelly 2002, pg. 171 and Rinard 2019, Sec. 356
 See, e.g., Berker 2013.57
 See also Barnett MSb.58
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is false regardless of  whether one believes it.  It is of  course irrational to believe 
propositions you know to be false.  I have in mind Moorean conjunctions, and other unusual 
propositions that arguably must be false if  believed, but which otherwise might be true.  For 
example, the proposition that you doubt everything must be false if  you believe it, and that 
seems like a good reason not to deliberately cause yourself  to do so.  Even so, a Pyrrhonian 
skeptic might have strong evidence supporting that she doubts everything, just as she can 
have strong evidence that she has hands.  It is at least arguable that her doubts about both 
these propositions are equally irrational, because they violate a requirement to believe what 
one’s evidence supports.  For another example even closer to Moorean conjunctions, 
consider: 
Unbelievable Consequences:  Sylvie knows that the Oracle’s past 
predictions all turned out true, so she rationally believes that today’s 
prediction will be true.  The Oracle then predicts:  “You, Sylvie, will not just 
now come to believe any new conjunctions.”  This new prediction seems 
plausible enough, so hearing it does not affect the rationality of  Sylvie’s 
belief  that the prediction is true. 
Sylvie rationally believes premises that entail the conjunction <Today’s prediction is that 
I won’t now believe any new conjunctions, and today’s prediction is true>.  But she can tell 
that if  she were to believe it, then it would be false.  That plausibly is enough to make it 
irrational for Sylvie to press a button causing herself  to believe the conjunction.  If  she aims 
to have only true beliefs, it would be irrational to deliberately cause a foreseeably erroneous 
one.   But does that mean it is irrational to believe the conjunction? 
NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS says it does, at least without further qualification.  For it 
prohibits holding foreseeably erroneous beliefs, not just deliberately causing them.  Thus in 
Unbelievable Consequences, it implies Sylvie is required not to believe the conjunction. 
Now I do not take this implication to be obviously false.  It is a tricky case, after all.  But I 
do think that on close examination it is better to reject it, and to say Sylvie is required to 
believe the conjunction.  Let me tell you why, before discussing a fallback position for those 
who are unconvinced. 
Sylvie is not in the position of  deliberating about whether to produce in herself  a belief  
in the conjunction.  She is in the position of  deliberating about whether the conjunction is 
true.  Since Sylvie rationally believes premises that entail that it is true, I say it is rational to 
believe it. 
Indeed, Sylvie might have no other permissible options available.  For we can suppose 
that the beliefs in her premises are themselves required.  Sylvie surely knows, and cannot 
permissibly doubt, the premise that the Oracle predicts she will believe no new conjunctions. 
And she can have arbitrarily strong inductive evidence for the premise that this prediction is 
true.   To be sure, if  Sylvie goes on to believe the conjunction, and has typical powers of  59
introspection, she will be able to recognize that she has done so, despite the Oracle’s 
prediction.  At that point, Sylvie will have reason to change her mind about the premise that 
 Depending on how liberal we are with attributing beliefs, it might seem unrealistic to suppose any agent 59
might go even a moment without forming beliefs in many conjunctions.  If  so, we might suppose Sadie 
considers herself  unusually skeptical, or else that the prediction includes some more idiosyncratic condition 
that the belief  in question happens to meet.  Thanks to anonymous editors for pressing this.
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the Oracle’s prediction is true, and so may no longer be required to believe her conjunction. 
If  fact, if  you accept (over my protests) that self-blindness is impossible, then you will think 
all this is bound to happen.   But this shows only that Sylvie’s requirement to believe the 60
conjunction is short-lived.  Once she believes what is required, she will learn something new, 
and her situation will be different.  This does not mean she is not now required to believe 
the conjunction, given her current situation. 
So on my preferred view, NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS faces a counterexample, and 
should be rejected.  It can be rational, and even required, for Sylvie to adopt a belief  that is 
foreseeably erroneous.  And if  so, it is hard to see why the same could not go for Moorean 
beliefs, unless we have some other reason to think self-knowledge is rationally required.  For 
if  there could be an ideally rational but self-blind agent who believes it will rain while lacking 
introspective knowledge of  her belief, she might find herself  in a situation like Sylvie’s.  For 
she might falsely believe that she does not believe it will rain, and indeed might even be 
required to, if  she has strong misleading behavioral evidence that she lacks the belief.  On 
the view I am pushing, it then will be rational to believe the Moorean conjunction that it will 
rain, but that she does not believe it will.  To be sure, even a self-blind agent ought to foresee 
that a belief  in a Moorean conjunction would be erroneous.  And that might mean it is 
irrational even for self-blind agents to deliberately cause themselves to believe Moorean 
conjunctions.  But that does not mean it is irrational to believe them. 
While that is what I think we should say about Moorean and other peculiar self-
falsifying beliefs, you do not need to agree me in order to see some bigger problems with 
relying on them to support self-knowledge requirements.  Supporters of  NO FORESEEABLE 
ERRORS have two plausible avenues for resisting my claim that it is rational for Sylvie to 
believe her conjunction, and for a hypothetical self-blind agent to believe a Moorean one. 
But both come at great expense.  My fallback position is that even if  these succeed as local 
defenses of  the irrationality of  Moorean beliefs, they end up undermining the broader 
motivation for self-knowledge requirements in other ways. 
The first response is to say that Sylvie can permissibly withhold belief  from her 
conjunction, even while she believes each conjunct separately.  This means rejecting: 
(RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE)  If  one considers the matter and 
one knows that p and q jointly entail r, then rationality requires that if  one 
believes both that p and that q with sufficient confidence, then one believes 
that r. 
But RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE is hard to give up.  We have seen that 
unqualified closure requirements like SINGLE PREMISE CLOSURE face overdemandingness 
and defeasibility objections.  Maybe this means they should be rejected, or qualified.  Or that 
rationality’s requirements are in fact demanding and indefeasible.  Whatever we say about 
these issues, RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE sidesteps them by applying only when 
one considers a conclusion and knows that it is entailed by one’s premises.  Multi-premise 
closure principles also are known to face distinctive problems involving the accumulation of  
 Cf. Smithies’ (2019) discussion of  finkish propositional justification.  See also fn. 66 below for more.60
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risk over multiple premises, for example in preface cases.   RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE 61
CLOSURE avoids those, too, by applying (stipulatively) only to cases where one believes two 
premises with sufficient confidence to prevent the accumulation of  risk from being a factor. 
(We can suppose Sylvie believes the relevant premises with arbitrarily high confidence, and 
considers whether their conjunction is true.) 
For all that, maybe RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE could be rejected by the 
proponent of  NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS.  She might want to further restrict the closure 
requirement so as to not require foreseeably erroneous beliefs, or even say that rationality 
has no closure requirement at all.  But even if  this response is plausible taken on its own, it is 
not available to the Moorean supporter of  self-knowledge requirements.  For it saves NO 
FORESEEABLE ERRORS at the expense of  undermining its broader relevance to self-
knowledge.  Remember, the point of  prohibiting foreseeable errors was to motivate NO 
MOOREAN BELIEFS, which prohibits beliefs in Moorean conjunctions.  And that was 
supposed to motivate, if  not a requirement to know one’s beliefs, then at least a prohibition 
against having erroneous higher-order beliefs about them.  But this crucially assumes that if  
it is irrational to believe the Moorean conjunction <p, but I don’t believe that p>, then it 
must be irrational to jointly believe that p and believe that one does not believe that p.  It is 
hard to see why we should assume this if  we reject even a weak closure requirement like 
RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE.  We surely should not assume it if  rationality has 
no closure requirement at all.  And we still should not assume it if  rationality has a closure 
requirement that is restricted so as to not require foreseeably erroneous beliefs, since 
Moorean beliefs are foreseeably erroneous, too. 
Thus the first response undermines a crucial assumption behind what in Section 2 I 
called the ‘direct’ motivation for self-knowledge requirements.  In doing so, I think it also 
manages to undermine the ‘indirect’ motivation, which appeals to an inference to the best 
explanation.  For suppose Sylvie can, if  she is ideally rational, avoid a foreseeably erroneous 
belief  in her conjunction even while believing both its conjuncts.  If  so, then a hypothetical 
self-blind agent should be able to avoid Moorean beliefs even without any capacity for self-
knowledge.  For even if  the self-blind agent is misled into erroneous higher-order beliefs, he 
still will avoid beliefs in the relevant foreseeably erroneous Moorean conjunction, just as 
Sylvie allegedly will.  The upshot is that if  we reject RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE, 
there is no apparent way to motivate self-knowledge requirements on Moorean grounds. 
The second response takes another tack.  It grants that Sylvie is required to believe the 
conjunction, as RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE says.  But it says she also can be 
required not to believe it, in keeping with NO FORESEEABLE ERRORS.  The response thus 
deems Unbelievable Consequences a rational dilemma, in which rationality’s requirements 
are not mutually satisfiable. 
Now there may be general objections to allowing the requirements of  rationality to pull 
agents in conflicting directions like this.   But even setting general objections aside, allowing 62
them in the present context again undermines the broader Moorean motivation for self-
knowledge requirements.  If  Unbelievable Consequences is admitted as a dilemma, an 
 See, e.g., Kyburg 1961 and Christensen 2004, and for further connections to Moore’s paradox, Sorensen 61
1988, pp. 23-26.
 For further discussion, see Barnett forthcoming and MSc.62
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opponent of  self-knowledge requirements can say the same for an alleged self-blind agent 
who believes it will rain, but whose behavioral evidence supports that he doesn’t believe it. 
That is, even if  the agent is prohibited from believing the relevant Moorean conjunction, he 
might still rationally hold beliefs that generate a conflicting requirement to believe it. 
In response, it could be claimed that if  believing the Moorean conjunction is 
prohibited, it follows by RESTRICTED MULTI-PREMISE CLOSURE that this allegedly self-blind 
agent is required not to jointly believe both conjuncts.  But I am not sure this does follow if  
rationality’s requirements are admitted to be inconsistent.  For comparison, if  we say Sylvie is 
in a dilemma with respect to her belief  in the conjunction, that does not obviously make her 
beliefs in the premises irrational.  And even if  did follow, it would provide only a Pyrrhic 
victory for for rationalist theories of  introspection that uphold self-knowledge requirements. 
For it would at best show that if  the self-blind agent rationally believes it will rain, he is 
required to avoid the erroneous higher-order belief  that he does not believe it.  It will not 
mean he is permitted to avoid this erroneous higher-order belief, much less permitted to adopt 
the true higher-order belief  that he does believe it will rain.  Although technically consistent 
with some self-knowledge requirements, it is hard to square this result with an overall 
satisfying view connecting self-knowledge and rationality.  A ban on foreseeably erroneous 
beliefs cannot support a bona fide self-knowledge requirement if  it cannot even guarantee us 
permissible higher-order belief. 
5. Second Route to Self-Knowledge Requirements: Inference to the Best Explanation 
There is another way to motivate NO MOOREAN BELIEFS, the rational prohibition on 
believing Moorean conjunctions.  It draws on influential epistemic accounts of  Moorean 
assertions, as proposed for example by Claudio de Almeida, Timothy Chan, Uriah Kriegel, 
Sydney Shoemaker, and John Williams.   Instead of  invoking troublesome assumptions 63
about the general irrationality of  foreseeably erroneous beliefs, it appeals to the widely 
acknowledged datum that asserting Moorean conjunctions is irrational.  The idea is that 
Moorean beliefs being irrational would elegantly explain why Moorean assertions are 
irrational.  And if  so, the irrationality of  Moorean beliefs could be supported by an inference 
to the best explanation. 
The details of  the epistemic account will take some filling in.  But the rough idea is this. 
Among the aims of  agents in normal situations is the alethic aim not to assert falsehoods. 
Given this aim, it will ceteris paribus be irrational for an agent to assert a proposition unless 
she believes it to be true.  So if  Moorean beliefs are irrational, Moorean assertions are, too. 
To be sure, supporters of  epistemic accounts do not always represent themselves as 
supporting NO MOOREAN BELIEFS by an inference to the best explanation.  Sometimes they 
take the irrationality of  Moorean beliefs to be independently obvious, in addition to best 
explaining the data about Moorean assertions.  I explained in Section 4 why I don’t buy that 
NO MOOREAN BELIEFS is a datum like NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS.  In this section, I 
address the claim that it best explains the uncontroversial data.  I will not deny that epistemic 
accounts also can explain the irrationality of  Moorean assertions.  Instead, I will propose an 
alternative explanation, which I think is better because there are further data that only it can 
explain. 
 de Almeida 2001 and 2007, Chan 2010, Kriegel 2004, Shoemaker 1996, and Williams 2006 and 2007.  See 63
also Green and Williams 2007 for review.
16
Now it is widely acknowledged that epistemic accounts are not the only game in town. 
As noted in Section 3, there are also pragmatic accounts, which include Gricean accounts, 
Wittgensteinian expressivist accounts, and more.  I don’t know of  any generally accepted 
criterion for an account’s qualifying as pragmatic.  But one salient feature of  many such 
accounts is an appeal to aims (or norms) for assertion that go beyond an alethic aim to assert 
only truths.  For example, some appeal to an aim to persuade one’s audience in a certain way, 
and others to using avowals to express one’s beliefs. 
While my main objective is to oppose epistemic accounts, I do not accept a traditional 
pragmatic account, either.  This is because I agree with supporters of  epistemic accounts 
that the pragmatic aims or norms these accounts invoke are not really needed to explain the 
irrationality of  Moorean assertions.  Whatever other aims speakers in normal circumstances 
have, they surely have alethic aims to assert truths but not falsehoods.  And these alethic 
aims suffice to explain the irrationality of  Moorean assertions, as illustrated by: 
Sadie’s Exam:  Sadie is taking a true or false exam, and aims to get as high a 
score as possible.  For each statement on the exam, Sadie can mark it as true 
or refrain.  She will receive a heavy penalty for each marked falsehood and a 
small bonus for each marked truth, with the ratio of  penalty to bonus 
equaling the ratio of  the disvalue of  false assertion to the value of  true 
assertion.  The first statement on the exam is ‘It will rain, but I, Sadie, don’t 
believe that it will rain.’ 
It seems irrational for Sadie to mark the statement, her behavioral evidence about her 
belief  notwithstanding.  But she has no Gricean aims to cooperate with an audience, or 
Wittgensteinian aims to express herself.  Nor does she have any other relevant non-alethic 
aims, such as a Williamsonian aim to mark only statements that she knows.   (It might for 64
example be rational to mark ‘My lottery ticket will lose’.)  This does not automatically show 
that pragmatic accounts are false.  Perhaps the irrationality of  Moorean assertions is 
overdetermined, making multiple explanations of  their irrationality true.  But it does show 
that no pragmatic account tells the full story.  Since it is irrational for Sadie to mark the 
statement given her (by stipulation) purely alethic aims, whatever explains this ought also to 
explain the irrationality of  Moorean assertion for an agent in a normal situation, who also 
has alethic aims (perhaps among other aims). 
Epistemic accounts do not have this problem, since they can appeal only to alethic aims 
that Sadie shares with normal asserters.  That is something I think epistemic accounts get 
right.  Where they go wrong is in is in assuming that this makes the relationship between 
rational belief  and assertion a straightforward one.  Let endorsement be a general category 
covering assertion, marking as true on Sadie’s exam, or any similar action regarding some 
statement which is governed by alethic aims, and where the ratio of  disvalue of  false 
endorsement to the value of  true endorsement equals that for ordinary assertion.  (I assume 
this ratio to be high, since otherwise assertion might not be strong evidence of  belief—a 
point I return to in Section 6.)  Here is a first stab at the relationship between belief  and 
endorsement: 
 Cf. Littlejohn 2010 and Williamson 2000, pp. 253-254.64
17
(ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF) Rationality requires that one not endorse that p 
unless one believes that p.  65
ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF arguably favors epistemic accounts.  For it entails that a 
Moorean endorsement, whether an ordinary assertion or an endorsement on an exam like 
Sadie’s, can be rational only if  a Moorean belief  can be rational.  And so the irrationality of  
Moorean assertions can be explained by the alleged irrationality of  Moorean beliefs. 
But I think this explanation leaves something out.  There are many statements it might 
be irrational to endorse because it is irrational to believe them, such as obvious 
contradictions.  But Moorean endorsements seem to have a more distinctive self-
undermining character, which I think should feature in a complete account of  their 
irrationality.  Despite important differences we will return to, just compare Sadie’s Exam to 
the following: 
Ned’s Exam:  Neutral Ned is taking an exam like Sadie’s.  When he reaches 
the final statement, he still has not endorsed any statements, and based on his 
track record he believes he will not endorse the final statement, either.  He 
then reads the final statement, which says ‘I, Ned, do not endorse any 
statements on this exam.’ 
Ned should not endorse.  Even though he believes the statement is true, he should 
recognize that it must be false if  he endorses it.  And plausibly, if  Ned is deciding whether to 
endorse, he should consider not just whether the statement is true, but whether it will or 
would be true if  he does so. 
I will argue that something similar goes for Moorean statements like Sadie’s.  Even 
supposing that it could be rational to believe a Moorean statement, it still would be irrational 
to endorse it.  For one should recognize that it probably is not true if  one does.  That of  
course not show that Moorean beliefs really can be rational.  But it does undercut a reason to 
think they cannot be, namely the epistemic account’s inference to the best explanation of  
Moorean endorsements. 
Statements like Ned’s complicate the relationship between belief  and endorsement.  It 
can be irrational to endorse them even if  you believe they are true.  From the looks of  
things, ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF cannot explain why, since it merely prohibits endorsing 
 See, e.g. Shoemaker 1996, pp. 76 and 213.65
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statements that are not believed.   And if  so, the right account will need some other 66
requirement to supplement or replace it.   The crucial question for us is whether the 67
replacement will end up applying to Moorean conjunctions, too.  For despite some 
similarities, we will see that there are important differences between Ned’s statement and a 
typical Moorean conjunction, differences which closely track those between two potential 
replacements for ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF: 
(ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC):  Rationality requires that one not endorse that p 
unless one believes that if  one were to endorse that p, then p. 
(ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI):  Rationality requires that one not endorse that p 
unless one believes that if  one does endorse that p, then p. 
Of  these, ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC will prove to be the requirement favoring 
epistemic accounts of  Moore’s paradox.  It permits endorsing a statement only when you 
believe the (non-backtracking) counterfactual that if  you were to endorse it, then it would be 
true.  Generally speaking, this will prohibit endorsing a statement which you believe only in 
cases where you think endorsing might cause (or constitute) the statement’s being false.  In 
contrast, ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI will prove to be the requirement favorable to my 
account.  It permits endorsing only when you believe the indicative conditional that if  you 
do endorse the statement, then it is true.  Importantly, this can prohibit endorsing a believed 
statement even when endorsing is merely evidence that the statement is false already. 
Arguably unlike ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF, these requirements both prohibit Ned from 
endorsing.  Ned should recognize that if  he will in fact endorse, then the statement is false. 
And he also should recognize that even if  he does not in fact endorse, the statement would 
have been false if  he had endorsed it.  But there are other cases where the requirements 
diverge.  Before returning to Moorean statements, consider one more example: 
Rachael’s Exam:  Based on strong evidence, Rachael believes herself  to be 
extremely risk-averse.  On her exam, she encounters the statement ‘I, 
Rachael, am extremely risk-averse.’  Although Rachael believes the statement, 
she believes even more strongly that an extremely risk-averse agent would 
not endorse it. 
 Could it be that despite appearances, ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF prohibits endorsing?  As anonymous editors 66
emphasize, if  Ned were to endorse the statement, his beliefs might change.  Assuming he knew he was 
endorsing the statement, he no longer would believe it, and thus would violate ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF. 
If  that is enough for ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF to deem endorsing irrational, that would be welcome 
news for me.  For the reasons discussed shortly, it would mean ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF can deem Moorean 
endorsements irrational without Moorean beliefs being irrational.  But I’m afraid it would be premature to 
declare victory.  For I suspect that ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF at best explains why endorsing would have been 
irrational for Ned if  he had done it.  In contrast, it seems to me Ned already has ample reason not to endorse, 
given his actual beliefs—which after all are the beliefs that must motivate him if  he decides to refrain.  So 
rather than look to the beliefs that Ned would have, conditional on his endorsing, I think it is better to do the 
same job by appealing to Ned’s actual conditional beliefs.  As we will see, doing so allows more wiggle room for 
my opponent, since it allows a possible explanation of  Ned’s Exam, invoking his beliefs in counterfactuals, that 
would not carry over for Moorean endorsements.
 I favor replacement.  Suppose the final statement instead had been ‘I, Ned, do at some time endorse a 67
statement on this exam.’  Ned should endorse, but ENDORSEMENT→BELIEF arguably says otherwise.
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Rachael’s situation is surely possible.  Given strong enough evidence, Rachael could 
rationally believe herself  to be risk-averse, even irrationally so.   But even if  so, Rachael 68
should not endorse.  While she believes the statement is true, she also thinks that if  she 
endorses, then it probably is not true after all.  To endorse a statement in such circumstances 
thus seems irrationally self-undermining. 
Rachael’s situation is different from Ned’s, however, since she should not take endorsing 
to have the causal power to alter her risk aversion.  What she believes is that if  she does 
endorse, then she (already) probably is not risk-averse; not that if  she were to endorse, then 
she would not be risk-averse.  For this reason, ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI yields the correct 
verdict that endorsing is irrational, but  ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC does not. 
This shows that ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC is too weak.  We need to replace or 
supplement it with something like ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI.   And this matters, because it 69
undermines the motivation for epistemic accounts of  Moore’s paradox.  So long as 
ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI is upheld, we can explain the irrationality of  Moorean 
endorsements without supposing Moorean beliefs to be irrational. 
To see why, suppose for sake of  argument that it is possible for an agent like Sadie to 
rationally believe her Moorean statement, ‘It will rain, but I, Sadie, do not believe it will rain’. 
This might happen, for example, if  Sadie could be self-blind, and have misleading behavioral 
evidence about her meteorological beliefs.  Even so, ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI will in 
normal circumstances prohibit Sadie from endorsing her statement, just as it did for Rachael. 
This is because Sadie’s endorsing the statement would be evidence Sadie believes each 
conjunct, so long as Sadie considers herself  more likely to endorse the statement if  she does. 
And by providing evidence that Sadie believes the first conjunct, her endorsing also provides 
evidence that the second conjunct is false.  So even if  Sadie believes the conjunction is true, 
she should recognize that if  she endorses, then it might not be true after all (and indeed, 
probably isn’t).  Thus ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI says endorsing a Moorean conjunctions is 
normally irrational even if  we suppose it can be rational for an agent to believe it. 
Even so, if  a Moorean conjunction like Sadie’s is true, her endorsing it would do 
nothing to change that.  If  Sadie can rationally believe the conjunction is true, she also 
should believe that if  she had endorsed it, then it still would have been true.  So like 
endorsing Rachael’s statement, endorsing Sadie’s Moorean conjunction does not violate 
ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC. 
Moorean endorsements are thus self-undermining in a peculiar way.  If  Sadie believes 
the conjunction, she should think endorsing would contribute to her score on the exam.  But 
she should not think it would on the assumption that she actually does endorse.  In 
terminology popularized by Richard Jeffrey, this means Moorean endorsements, along with 
other endorsements violating ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI but not ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC, 
are unratifiable.  70
 Christensen 2007b.68
 Again, I favor replacement.  Suppose Rachael instead encountered ‘I am not irrationally risk averse’. 69
ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFC arguably says endorsing is irrational, but I disagree.
 1983, pp. 15-20.70
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Roughly speaking, an action is (causally) unratifiable if  on the assumption one will 
adopt it, another of  one’s options has higher (causally) expected utility.   Actions of  this 71
general kind have been widely discussed since at least Gibbard and Harper’s Death in 
Damascus case.   While controversial, it is often thought that unratifiability somehow 72
counts against an action’s rationality.   Here is a recent example, which Andy Egan credits to 73
David Braddon-Mitchell:  74
Psychopath Button:  Paul stands before a button marked “KILL ALL 
PSYCHOPATHS”.  He would like to rid the world of  psychopaths, but not 
at the expense of  killing himself.  Paul believes with sufficient confidence 
that he is not a psychopath to make pressing rational, if  not for one final 
detail:  He is certain that only a psychopath would press the button. 
Should Paul press?  He believes he is not a psychopath, and thus that if  he were to 
press, he would kill all the psychopaths without killing himself.  But he also is certain that 
only a psychopath would press.  This makes pressing unratifiable, like endorsing in Sadie’s 
Exam and Rachael’s Exam.  For while Paul thinks he will not press, and thus that pressing 
would have the results he prefers, he should at the same time recognize that if  in fact he will 
press, then he must be a psychopath after all, in which case pressing will kill him.  Like Egan, 
I think this makes pressing irrational.  If  you agree, that is further reason to accept my claims 
regarding unratifiable endorsements, including endorsement of  a Moorean conjunction in 
Sadie’s Exam. 
More generally, I propose that Moorean endorsements are irrational because, by 
violating ENDORSEMENT→BELIEFI as discussed, they violate an even more general 
requirement against unratifiable actions.   Call this the ratificationist account.  It explains 75
the irrationality of  Moorean assertions in virtue of  what they have in common with other 
unratifiable actions like pressing in Psychopath Button, rather than by assuming with 
epistemic accounts that Moorean beliefs must be irrational.  In doing so, the ratificationist 
 For a precise definition, let U(B|A) be the (causally) expected utility of  B-ing conditional on the assumption 71
that one As, such that: 
 
Here Cr is the agent’s credence function and v her value function, which represents the degree to which she 
values relevant states of  affairs.  The Ks are dependence hypotheses—i.e., maximal hypotheses about how 
outcomes depend counterfactually on one’s actions that form a partition.  Given all this, we can say option A is 
(causally) unratifiable iff  one has an option O such that U(O|A) > U(A|A).
U B | A( ) = Cr K | A( )v KB( )
K∑ .
 Gibbard and Harper, 1978, pp. 156-159.72
 E.g., Barnett MSc, Egan 2007; Gallow MS; Gustafsson 2011; Harper 1986; pg. 33; and Wedgwood 2011.73
 Egan 2007.74
 The details of  such a requirement remain controversial, even among those who consider unratifiability to 75
count against an action’s rationality.  My own proposal, defended in Barnett MSc, holds that ratifiability comes 
in degrees, and that one should prefer options with higher ratifiability to options with lower.  Following the 
notation of  fn. 71, when one’s options are A-ing and B-ing, the ratifiability of  A-ing is defined as U(A|A) - 
U(B|A).  Importantly, this view says it is rational to adopt an unratifiable action when the alternatives are even 
less ratifiable.  This arguably is needed to allow refraining to be rational in Sadie’s Exam, Rachael’s Exam, and 
Psychopath Button.
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account appeals to rational requirements that are independently motivated if  we think these 
other unratifiable actions are irrational.  This does not directly show that Moorean beliefs 
can be rational.  But without independent reason to think they cannot be, we should not 
suppose as much simply to explain the irrationality of  Moorean assertions. 
6. Third Route to Self-Knowledge Requirements:  Shoemaker’s Reductio 
A final Moorean motivation for self-knowledge requirements comes from Sydney 
Shoemaker’s influential discussion of  self-blindness, the hypothetical condition of  lacking 
introspective self-knowledge despite being ideally rational.  Shoemaker argues from broadly 
Moorean considerations that it is impossible to suffer from this condition.  If  he is right, 
that at least gets us very close to alleged self-knowledge requirements like SELF-
KNOWLEDGE, which requires one not to hold a belief  without knowing that one does. 
Notwithstanding all the usual caveats about defeasibility and idealization, Shoemaker’s 
conclusion would apparently mean that an ideally rational agent, who by stipulation satisfies 
all genuine rational requirements, could not violate the alleged requirement SELF-
KNOWLEDGE.  Now there might still be some daylight between such claims about the 
properties of  ideally rational agents and claims about what rationality requires.   But I won’t 76
rest my opposition on these subtleties.  Instead, I hope to show that Shoemaker’s argument 
is unsound, considered on its own terms.  For all it shows, an agent could be ideally rational 
despite lacking introspective knowledge of  her beliefs. 
Shoemaker’s argument against the possibility of  self-blindness proceeds by reductio. 
Even supposing self-blindness is possible, he claims, any self-blind agent would on account 
of  her rationality avoid Moorean assertions, or any other actions evincing her self-blindness. 
So, where self-aware agents are rational agents with a genuine faculty self-knowledge, 
Shoemaker claims: 
(BEHAVIORAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY) Self-blind agents would act like self-
aware agents. 
Shoemaker regards as absurd the conclusion that self-blind agents are possible, but would act 
just like self-aware agents.  So he rejects the supposition that self-blindness is possible at all. 
Now BEHAVIORAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY is the crucial lemma that Shoemaker 
supports via Moore’s paradox, and it is the one I focus on below.  But other critics might 
instead just accept the alleged absurdum that self-blind agents are possible, but would act like 
we self-aware agents.  As Amy Kind emphasizes, anyone who rejects behaviorism thinks it is 
possible for two agents to differ mentally while resembling each other behaviorally.   Unless 77
we are behaviorists, why not say the same of  self-blind and self-aware agents? 
But it is not clear to me that the charge of  behaviorism sticks.  Anticipating it, 
Shoemaker emphasizes that a faculty for genuine self-knowledge is not just a metaphysical 
 Shoemaker’s conclusion might be weaker than SELF-KNOWLEDGE if  necessary conditions on ideal rationality 76
need not be genuine rational requirements.  (Maybe there is no rational requirement not to be a round square, 
despite the impossible of  an ideally rational agent who is a round square.)  For one way Shoemaker’s conclusion 
might be stronger than SELF-KNOWLEDGE, see Section 7 below.
 Kind 2003.77
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possibility, but is actually present in us, the products of  evolution by natural selection.  If  
self-blind agents were possible, but would act just like self-aware agents, then it would be 
inexplicable why we have such a faculty.  For it could not plausibly confer any reproductive 
advantage without affecting our behavior in some way.  As Shoemaker puts it, “[f]rom an 
evolutionary perspective it would certainly be bizarre to suppose that, having endowed 
creatures with everything necessary to give them a certain very useful behavioral 
repertoire…Mother Nature went through the trouble of  instilling in them an additional 
mechanism…whose impact on behavior is completely redundant.”  78
While this response is hardly decisive, I share Shoemaker’s sense that there is something 
mildly fishy, if  not entirely absurd, about supposing ourselves to have a psychological faculty 
for self-knowledge with no behavioral effects.  Yet if  we grant BEHAVIORAL 
INDISTINGUISHABILITY, the most obvious way to avoid the fishiness is to follow Shoemaker 
in denying the possibility of  self-blindness altogether.  So I say we reject BEHAVIORAL 
INDISTINGUISHABILITY instead.  Our capacity for self-knowledge is not behaviorally inert, 
and self-blind agents, while possible, would not act like we do.  79
Why does Shoemaker accept BEHAVIORAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY?  His argument is 
developed in papers spanning several decades, and resists easy summary.  But the basic 
outline is: 
(NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS) Rationality requires one not to assert 
propositions of  the form <p, but I don’t believe that p>. 
(PROXY)  If  rationality requires one not to assert propositions of  the form 
<p, but I don’t believe that p>, then rationality requires acting like a self-
aware agent. 
(CONFORMITY) Self-blind agents would conform to rationality’s 
requirements. 
Therefore, (BEHAVIORAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY) Self-blind agents would 
act like self-aware agents. 
NO MOOREAN ASSERTIONS is a datum, and CONFORMITY is trivial given the definition 
of  self-blindness.  The crucial premise is PROXY.  Why accept it?  The rough idea is that 
Moorean assertions are a good general proxy for other actions that might evince an agent’s 
self-blindness.  If  rationality alone enables a self-blind agent to “appreciate the logical 
impropriety of  affirming something while denying that one believes it,” then it also will 
enable her to “give appropriate answers to questions about what she believes,” and more 
generally to act self-aware.  80
 1996, pp. 239-240.78
 So what are the main advantages conferred by our capacity for introspection?  While this is an important 79
question, I will avoid amateur speculation.  What can responsibly be done from the armchair, in my view, is to 
reject Shoemaker’s extreme claim that a contingent faculty for self-knowledge would have no behavioral effects 
at all.
 1996, pg. 237.80
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In contrast, I think Moorean assertions are idiosyncratic.  First, they are conjunctive, 
evincing both first-order and higher-order belief  in a single action, which is what gives them 
their distinctive self-defeating character.  Second, they are assertions.  What goes for them 
might not go for other kinds of  actions, even ones with a broadly Moorean character.   
Shoemaker in effect addresses the first idiosyncrasy, arguing that just as self-blind agents 
recognize the impropriety of  asserting ‘It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain’, they 
should recognize the impropriety of  separately asserting ‘It will rain’ and ‘I don’t believe it 
will rain’.  If  so, self-blind agents will aim to coordinate their first-order and higher-order 
assertions. 
But even if  this is granted, it falls short of  what Shoemaker needs to support PROXY. 
Aiming to coordinate doesn’t entail success.  Consider: 
George’s Exam:  Self-blind George is taking a true or false exam in 
permanent marker.  The first statement is ‘I, George, do not believe (right 
now) that it will rain.’  George must decide now whether to endorse the 
statement, and he cannot change his answer later.  Later on, he will 
encounter the statement ‘It will rain’.  George believes it will rain based on 
strong meteorological evidence, but his behavioral evidence misleadingly 
supports that he does not believe this.  (Perhaps he left his umbrella at 
home.) 
A self-aware agent in George’s situation could know by introspection that she believes it 
will rain, despite her behavioral evidence.  Being rational, she would then refrain from 
endorsing the first statement.  Will George?  His behavioral evidence supports the 
statement’s truth, and we are supposing he lacks introspective knowledge to the contrary. 
Given this supposition, it would seem the rational thing is for him to believe the statement, 
and act on his belief  by endorsing it.  So even if  George believes and acts in an ideally 
rational manner, his lack of  self-knowledge will show. 
 To be sure, George might aim to coordinate first-order and higher-order endorsements, 
and he will in fact endorse the first-order statement ‘It will rain’ later.  But that does not 
mean he will succeed at coordinating by refraining from the higher-order endorsement now. 
Because of  his false higher-order belief, when George makes the higher-order endorsement, 
he will falsely believe that he is coordinating. 
Now in Section 5, I claimed that rationality requires one not to endorse Moorean 
conjunctions, even if  one believes them.  If  so, an ideally rational agent like George would 
refrain from endorsing Moorean conjunctions.  Why are things different in George’s Exam? 
It is because one’s endorsing a Moorean conjunction is self-defeating in a way that endorsing 
either conjunct alone is not.  The act of  endorsing a Moorean conjunction amounts to 
evidence that the conjunction is false, making endorsing unratifiable.  But endorsing that it 
will rain is no evidence that it won’t rain, and endorsing that one lacks the belief  it will rain is 
no evidence that one has the belief.  This is where Moorean assertions get their self-
defeating character, which piecemeal assertions of  their conjuncts lack. 
Now I don’t take this objection to be decisive, since it leans on my own ratificationist 
account of  Moorean assertions.  But the second idiosyncrasy of  Moorean assertions—their 
being assertions—is harder to dismiss.  To make the point independent of  the first 
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idiosyncrasy, I focus on a special class of  actions I call Moorean actions, which are actions 
known to pay off  just in case some Moorean proposition is true.  I think Moorean assertions 
aren’t just a poor general proxy for actions evincing self-blindness, but a poor proxy even for 
this special class of  actions devised to resemble them. 
By stipulation, Moorean endorsements must have a certain risk profile; the ratio of  the 
disvalue of  false endorsement to the value of  true endorsement has to be quite high, to 
match ordinary assertion.  This is why one’s endorsing a proposition amounts to strong 
evidence that one believes it.  But many Moorean actions do not have this feature, such as: 
Umbrella Rental:  George believes that it will rain based on strong 
meteorological evidence, but his behavioral evidence supports that he is 
uncertain whether it will rain.  An umbrella vendor offers short-term 
umbrella rentals.  The cost of  the rentals are balanced with the 
unpleasantness of  getting wet such that a rational agent will rent an umbrella 
unless she believes it will be useless, in which case she won’t rent.  But today 
they are all out of  ordinary umbrellas.  Instead, they have a special Moorean 
umbrella that only opens if  the agent did not believe it would rain at the time 
of  rental.   
Renting the umbrella is a Moorean action because George knows it will pay off  just in 
case it rains but he does not believe that it will rain.  But will rational George avoid a 
Moorean umbrella rental, like he would avoid asserting the corresponding Moorean 
conjunction?  Not necessarily.  Unlike asserting, renting a Moorean umbrella is not strong 
evidence that George believes it will rain, and so not strong evidence that the Moorean 
conjunction is false.  It would be strong evidence that George lacks the belief  that it won’t 
rain, but that is what his behavioral evidence already supports.  Given his supposed self-
blindness, it is hard to see what might stop him from renting.  This stands in contrast to a 
self-aware agent in George’s situation.  Since this agent would know introspectively that she 
believes it will rain, she will know the umbrella is useless, and won’t rent it.  So contrary to 
Shoemaker’s claims, this introspective self-knowledge will hardly be behaviorally redundant. 
Once again, the difference between self-aware and self-blind agents will show. 
The same goes for Moorean actions that resemble paradigmatic Moorean endorsements 
by involving an explicit formulation of  the relevant proposition, such as: 
Alternate Scoring:  George is again taking a true or false exam.  But this 
time, the penalty for incorrectly marking a statement as true is no greater 
than the bonus for correctly doing so.  The first statement on the exam is ‘It 
will rain, but I, George, do not believe it will rain.’  As usual, George believes 
it will rain based on strong meteorological evidence, but his behavioral 
evidence supports that he does not believe that it will rain. 
Here George expressly considers a Moorean conjunction.  Assuming he is rational but 
self-blind, he may well mark it as true.  For his doing so might be little evidence of  belief, 
and hence little evidence the statement is false.  This is in contrast to a self-aware agent in 
the same situation.  Since she will believe it will rain, and know that she does, she will not 
mark the statement as true. 
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The upshot is that we should reject PROXY.  Moorean assertions have an idiosyncratic 
risk profile.  This makes Moorean assertions not just bad proxies for some actions, but even 
for actions that are contrived to closely resemble them, like marking a Moorean conjunction 
in Alternate Scoring, or renting a Moorean umbrella in Umbrella Rental.  And if  PROXY is 
false, then self-blind agents will not necessarily act like self-aware ones in general, even 
though they resemble them in avoiding Moorean assertions.  So BEHAVIORAL 
INDISTINGUISHABILITY is false, and Shoemaker’s argument for the impossibility of  self-
blindness is unsound. 
7. Conclusion 
Supporters of  self-knowledge requirements hold that self-knowledge is required by 
rationality, like avoiding inconsistency, or adopting means apparently conducive to one’s 
ends.  We have seen little support for this claim from Moore’s paradox.  But have we seen 
positive reason to reject it?  That depends on whether self-knowledge is proposed as a basic 
requirement, or as a consequence of  familiar requirements for consistency and the like.  On 
the former proposal, one might satisfy the familiar requirements without knowing one’s 
beliefs, but still fail to be ideally rational by violating an additional requirement for self-
knowledge.  On the latter, it is impossible to fully satisfy even these familiar requirements 
without having self-knowledge.  81
I think we have seen good reason to reject the latter view.  In discussing Shoemaker’s 
reductio we examined the behavior of  a hypothetical agent who satisfied familiar requirements 
of  epistemic and prudential rationality, but who had mistaken beliefs about his own beliefs. 
This hypothetical assumption generated intelligible predictions for his behavior, and led to 
no obvious contradictions.  This alone does not show that self-blindness is possible, or that 
rationality fails to require self-knowledge.  But it does support that self-knowledge 
requirements do not follow from ones we already accept.  Any requirement to know one’s 
own mind must be a further basic requirement, which requires independent motivation. 
And the main candidate source of  motivation, Moore’s paradox, doesn’t seem to provide 
any. 
 Shoemaker arguably endorses this view.  See, e.g., 1996, pp. 32-33.81
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